

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000300260002-5 \overbrace{SECRET}

28 APR 1690

	MEMORANDUM FOR:	D/PGO John AB/PAO QUI	
	FROM:	ABYPAO COS	**************************************
	SUBJECT:	Criteria for Compliance with FY 1982-86 Guidance	production of the state of the
	REFERENCE:	D/PGO memorandum for D/DCI/RM, subject as above, dated 10 April 80	
25X1	1. Reference identifies three options for using several lists of "compliance criteria" which have been developed to evaluate Program Managers' compliance with the FY 1982-86 Guidance. I see no problem in using the criteria for "internal purposes" or as a standard format for briefing on the general nature of the submissions. I do not think we should provide the lists to the Program Managers as a way of "re-identifying" for them the kinds of concerns RMS will bring to Program Review. I personally think it is too late in the process to send the Program Managers anything of that nature. It just seems to be an ex post facto action that may disrupt whatever actions are already underway to comply with the guidance. Some thought should be given, however, to including a section in next year's guidance which outlines the criteria that will be used by RMS to evaluate the FY 1983-87 submission.		25 X1
25X1	2. Attached, for your information and review, are some thoughts which prepared based upon his recent work in the exploitation area. I remember full well that the guidance was a joint product and that PAO's inputs were neither timely nor complete in many instances. However, there is considerable merit to the point which Bob is trying to make. I recommend that we all consider this point when developing next year's guidance.		25X1 25X1
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- 3. Specific PAO comments on the reference are as follows:
- a. The GDIP Program Manager should be reminded of the second paragraph on page 7 of the DCI's Program Guidance for the GDIP:

"The Army's ability to collect useful and unique intelligence via clandestine means and the suitability of the Controlled Collection Objectives (CCOs) with which all Army clandestine collection units are tasked are subject to question. Specific guidance to DIA and the Army has been provided to the GDIP Program Manager by the D/DCI/RM." The "specific guidance" was contained in a letter from the D/DCI/RM to General Tighe on 7 December (D/DCI/RM 79-2397). We would expect that the actions requested in paragraph 2 of that letter will have been undertaken and that we will receive a status report on their implementation by 1 May.

b. The NRP Program Manager should be reminded of the following:

For those activities intended for use at crisis and higher levels of conflict, did the Program Manager insure that the degree of survivability was commensurate with the intended use?

Attachment

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Copy No. 1 - D/PGO
2 - D/PBO
3 - D/IRO
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D/DCI/RM 28 April 1980)

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The idea of writing guidance and then not knowing whether it has been satisfactorily complied with says more about the guidance than about the criteria for compliance. There can be two sources of obfuscation in the guidance:

- (1) guidance items are not specific enough.
- (2) guidance is not coherent across items.
- (1) For example, consider the guidance item:

"Investigate the utility of the U & S commands to perform a portion of National imagery exploitation mission."

What is meant by the word investigate? Which of the following are satisfactory "investigations"?

- (1) Think about MTP delegation for 2 months.
- (2) Think about NTP delegation for 5 minutes.
- (3) Collect and report quantitative data.
- (4) Collect, analyze and report quantitative data.
- (5) Tally opinions.
- (6) Analyze opinions.
- (7) Talk to interested parties.
- (8) Write something down.
- (9) Recommend a change.
- (10) List the pros and cons of each method.
- (11) Provide some new insight into MTP revision.
- (12) Measure heretofore unmeasured quantities.
- (13) Take a novel approach to solving the problem.

The point is that all of these can be thought of as "investigations". Unless we specify, we can't possibly evaluate or measure compliance.

In the same guidance item, what is "utility"? The guidance has left it entirely to the investigator to decide. If we know what we want as a utility measure, we must specify it. If part of the problem is specifying the measure then we must work with the investigator to specify it (and explicitly state this in the guidance). Otherwise we will either be saddled with a potentially useless measure of value or be reduced to simply second guessing the investigator after the fact. Both should be avoided.


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(2) Another reason the value of guidance compliance cannot be measured readily is because the guidance is not written as a coherent whole. The IDEX Utilization Plan, for example, is tasked independently of the above NTP delegation study. How useful is it to know how many IDEXs organizations need if the tasks each is performing may change? The quality of the analyses are in some measure only as good as the quality of the guidance.

The above NTP delegation guidance could have been more clearly communicated, and its compliance measured by something such as:

"Document the current and future exploitation tasks performed by the U & S commands. Compare these to current National exploitation options to provide a first order estimate of exploitation redundancy. Make recommendations as to the utility of delegating some National tasking to the U & S commands. (Work with RMS/PAO to develop useful utility measures). Consider carefully the implications for such tasking on manpower, IDEXs, facilities and APP."



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